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Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar (InSAR) is a 
promising new technology, which has detected and identified 
explosions of 1 kton at a depth of 500 meters at the Nevada 
Test Site. InSAR cannot detect all nuclear explosions under 1 
kton at all locations, but if the test is roughly located by 
seismic or other data to a general location, InSAR can 
discriminate between explosions and earthquakes by the 
shape of the interference pattern. In addition, InSAR can
determine absolute locations for on-site inspections to 100 
meters, or 0.01 square kilometers. The larger the test the 
more useful InSAR becomes.
National Technical Means can detect, discriminate and locate
nuclear tests at chosen sensitive locations with greater 
accuracy than that obtained by the IMS. An unclassified 
description of NTM technologies is included in this paper.
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InSAR combines the data from two separate SAR measurements,
with the orbital and topographic effects removed. See M. Pritchard,
Physics Today 59(7), 68-69 (2006).
Table 1. Monitoring Methods to Monitor the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
The following array of technologies and assets provide 
capabilities to detect potential violations of the CTBT. The 
capabilities of the International Monitoring System and the U.S.
National Technical Means make the CTBT effectively verifiable.
[Sources: National Academy of Sciences, Technical Issues 
Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (2002) 
and D. Hafemeister, "Progress in CTBT Monitoring Since its
1999 Senate Defeat," Science and Global Security 15, 151-183 
(2007) and D. Hafemeister, "The Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty: Effectively Verifiable," Arms Control Today 38(8), 6-12 
(October 2008).]
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Seismic
NAS concluded that explosions
above 0.1 kton in hard rock can
be detected in Asia, Europe, North
America and North Africa.
Tests in cavities can be detected
above 1-2 kton for advanced
nuclear weapon states, with risk of
venting and excursion yields. This
limit is perhaps 0.1 kt for new
nuclear nations.
IMS will use 50 primary and
120 auxiliary seismic stations.
Arrays of seismographs and
regional seismographs can
obtain lower threshold yields.
In addition, thousands of non-
IMS stations have data that
could trigger an on-site
inspection.
Hydroacoustic
NAS concluded that explosions
above a few kilograms can be
detected in Southern Hemisphere,
and above 1 ton for all oceans.
IMS will use six hydrophone
arrays and five T-physics
monitoring stations.
Infrasound
NAS concluded that explosions
above 1 kton in the atmosphere
can be detected, and above 0.5
kton over continents.
IMS will use 60 infrasound
monitoring stations.
Radionuclide
NAS concludes that explosions
above 0.1–1 kton can be detected
to identify the event as a nuclear
explosion. The 0.6 kton North
Korean test was detected at 7,000
km distance.
IMS will use 80 particulate
monitoring stations, and 40 of
these will also detect
radioxenon. NTM sensors can
also be placed on airplanes for
close approaches to suspected
test sites.
InSAR InSAR measures subsidence as low United States has four
(Interferometric as 0.2-0.5 cm in many locations, classified SAR satellites.
Synthetic with yields above 1 kton at 500 m Europe, Canada and Japan sell
Aperture Radar) depth. InSAR can determine
locations to 100 meters.
unclassified SAR data for as
low as $3,000 each.
On-Site
Inspections
Any CTBT party can request an
OSI, which needs 30 of 51 votes in
the Executive Council.
Photos and radioactivity
obtained by air and ground.
Mini seismic arrays can observe
aftershocks. Magnetic
anomalies, SAR, soil data
obtained with GPS locations.
Confidence- After CTBT enters into force, Close-in sensors could detect
Building nuclear weapon states could seismic, infrasound,
Measures
locate more sensors at test sites
to lower thresholds further.
electromagnetic pulse,
radionuclide and other data
indicative of a test.
National
Technical
Means
U.S. NTM technologies have
considerable reach and precision.
NTM sensors are located in
space, in the atmosphere, on
the ground, in the oceans and
underground.
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Nevada Test Site (NTS) InSAR Data from Paul
Vincent, et al, Geophysical Research Letters 30(22), 
2141 (2003). The local magnitude of the tests are (left
to right) ML = 3.9, 4.4, 2.7 at depths of 340, 401 and 
244 meters. The InSAR threshold detection level at
NTS is 1 kton at 500 m depth, based on the
Nonproliferation Experiment (ML = 4.06) with the 1.4 
kton chemical explosion (2.8 kton effective nuclear
yield) and the NTS relation  mb = 3.87  +  0.75 log(Y).
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The Jubilee Tube (subway) commemorated Queen
Elizabeth II's Silver Jubilee. The tunnel is 20 meters
below the surface, and the surface subsided by 2.5 cm
from 1992 to 2001. The InSAR data shown below
shows a linear subsidence with time with individual
data points having an accuracy of better than 2 mm with
excellent location. See G. Rennie, Sci. Tech. Rev. 4-11
(April 2005).
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SAR Locations are obtained from amplitude and
phase maps:
Doppler shift range direction (+ forward, - aft)
timing is used in the azimuthal direction
SAR Spatial Resolution (!x) is determined from
the effective diameter of the radar antenna
(product of process time and orbital speed) and
the radar wavelength.
" = #/d = #/2vTprocess 
" = (0.03 m)/2(7500 m/s)(0.2 s) = 10 mrad
!X = R" = (2-4 x 105 m)(10 mrad) = 2-4 m
Commercial: azimuthal (5m), range (20m),
and soon to be improved.
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InSAR Spatial Resolution
Double Difference Method (12 - 23).
Vincent (12 - Digital Elevation Model) =
 
subsidence.
 
Can minimize atmospheric and vegetation phase
 
shifts with many data sets.
 
Horizontal Resolution = 30 meters.
 
Vertical resolution = 2 mm at NTS, London and
 
elsewhere and 5 mm or more at other locations.
 
Relevant Areas
Nuclear Ex. Crater = 100 m = 0.1 km
Nuclear Ex. Subsidence > 1 km
CTBT OSI = 1,000 km2 
Radar Picture = 10,000 km2 
INSAR absolute locations = 100 m = 0.1 km
InSAR Area = 0.01 km2 
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N. Korean 9 Oct. 2006 test from D. Albright and
P. Brannon (ISIS, Washington, DC) with data before
(17 September 2006) and after 17 Sept. 2006 and
13 Oct. 2006).
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Google Earth and InSAR Earth
D. Albright locates DPRK test sites with satellite
photos after cueing.
 
Frank Pabian (LANL) uses Google Earth on Iran at
 
IAEA, UN (2005-6), following NCRI tips.
 
Pabian (“Commercial Satellite Imagery… 
NonProliferation Monitoring Toolkit” (LANL book,
2008) and Nonproliferation Rev. 1998) lists 20
attempts to locate tests etc.
35 satellite imaging companies (17 nations)
41-50 cm BW and 170 cm multi-spectral 
resolution
See: spare tire on a medium-truck
hoop on a basketball court
5S’s: size, shape, shadow, shade, surrounding
objects and signatures and timing
1992: V. Gupta spots PRC reactor, Algeria
1998/06: D. Albright spots 2 Pu reactors, Pakistan
2005: D. Sanger (NYT) spots DPRK test site
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InSAR can be cued with seismic or other data.
 
Discriminate between Quakes (shear lobes) and

Explosions (Circles).
 
Elastic finite–element calculations.
 
LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION.
 
Examine for tunnels, roads, etc.
 
Search for subsidence above man-made cavities in
 
salt or hard rock.
 
"Google InSAR" Canadian Radarsat SAR data
($3-5,000 each, 8 m resolution, 50km x 50km)
Software $20-40,000.
Many InSAR graduate students in geophysics.
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NTM Assets
(2002):  33 GPS satellites with sensors:
bhangmeter, 5 x-ray, 2 gamma, neutron
Infrared: 23 DSP (last one 2007), 10-20 SBIRS
(BMD)?
EMP (LANL): ALEXIS, FORTE, CIBOLA (2007)
Locate with RF and optical, lightning research, 70o 
Ionosphere distortions, RF noise
SAR:  4 U.S. Lacrosse, EU, Japan, Canada…..
 
NAS Footnote 33:  “disagreements persists” on 1979 

test, but “Today’s instrumentation …improved...to 

enable unambiguous interpretation of such events.”
 
Optical/IR Reconnaissance:  KH12, CCD’s etc. 

Particle Analyzers:  SOPA and CEPPAD (polar orbit)
 
Computers in orbit:  terraflop (40 pounds, 80 W)
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Optical Bhangmeter. Double-peak signal from
atmospheric nuclear tests, by H. Argo (LANL) in D. 
Hafemeister, Physics of Societal Issues, (Springer 2007)
pg. 92.
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Electromagnetic Pulse Simulation. The direct and 
ground-reflected EMP signals give a double peak.
Receiver is tuned to 50 MHz with a 2 MHz bandwidth. 
[H. Argo, Physics of Societal Issues, pg. 93.]
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
    
  
 
      
      
   
        
        
     
   
      
 
 
  
      
   
     
     
 
   
      
 
Particle flux at a GPS satellite at 20,000 km. [H. 
Argo, Physics of Societal Issues, pg. 91.]
Neutrons: 2500 n/cm2-kton
5-keV X-rays: 108 Y(kt)/cm2 
Prompt gammas: 1500 Y(kt)/cm2 
U.S. National Academy of Sciences (2002, pg. 53-5):
”X-rays from explosions of about 1 kiloton can be
detected at ranges exceeding 100 million kilometers, 
comparable to the distance between Earth and the Sun.
Optical effects are observable from space from altitudes
between sea level to 100 kilometers over extended
ranges. … monitoring possibilities and unattractiveness
of space testing…..ban on space testing in LTBT of
1963.”
“To summarize, monitoring of space-based explosions
and of atmospheric explosions from space is based on 
powerful technologies which provided they continue to 
be deployed and maintained as needed for this mission,
will make it extremely unlikely that such testing can be
conducted without being detected and identified.  
Attribution might require additional information, such 
as from use of NTM to interpret missile-launch 
activities.”
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How Much Verification Is Enough?
Detect one of n covert tests. Pn = 1 – (1 – P1)
n .
3–test detection 1 test 3 tests
high confidence Ph  = 0.9 P3 = 0.999
medium confidence Pm = 0.5 P3 = 0.88 (Hi-Conf)
low confidence Pl  = 0.1 P3 = 0.27
Many Barriers to Cheating
 
Psuccess = $ i Pi = (Pventing)(Pyield-excursion) X
(Phide-materials)(Psubsidence)(Pregional-seismic)(Ptest-series)(PNTM)
• High confidence 90% for each step gives Psuccess =
(0.9)7 = 48%
• 4 failure paths, Psuccess = 66%
• Yield prediction and venting at medium confidence,
Psuccess = (0.9)
5(0.5)2 = 15%
National Intelligence Estimate and related papers
didn’t address this.
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